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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Judith Moran appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on her 
claims for post-termination employer retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and breach of contract relating to her stock options.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court with regards to Moran‟s claims of 
retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress and vacate the judgment with 
regard to her stock option claim and remand it for further proceedings.   
I. 
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We write for the parties‟ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  In 2005, DaVita, a dialysis service provider, acquired the company Gambro 
for whom Moran was a Regional Vice President.  As part of the acquisition, DaVita 
honored Moran‟s employment contract with Gambro.  The Employment Agreement 
provided:   
Either [DaVita] or Judith E. Moran may terminate Judith E. Moran‟s 
employment hereunder at any time with or without cause, by giving not less 
than six months prior written notice to the other party.  The employment 
expires following said six months period of notice.  
 
*** 
 
[DaVita] is at all times entitled to immediately remove Judith E. Moran 
from [her] employment duties, but with unaltered benefits for Judith E. 
Moran during the period of notice.  Any vacation entitlement shall be 
utilized during the period of notice at the request of [DaVita].   
 
Appendix (“App.”) 253-54.  The Employment Agreement also included a twelve-month 
severance package in addition to a one-year non-compete provision.  Additionally, Moran 
participated in a stock option plan which permitted her to purchase stock options at a set 
price after the options vested on October 31, 2006.   
After the acquisition, Moran began working with Javier Rodriguez, a member of 
DaVita‟s executive team.  Moran found that Rodriguez was critical of women‟s 
appearances, dismissive of her comments, and more supportive of the men on the 
executive team.  Generally, Moran felt there was a lack of female presence on the 
leadership team.  In March 2006, Moran met with Rodriguez to discuss her bonus.  
Rodriguez informed Moran at this time that her employment would be terminated 
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because the company was not satisfied with her performance, specifically citing problems 
with locations in Massachusetts and difficulties Moran experienced during the budget 
process.   
On May 2, 2006, Rodriguez provided Moran with her notice of termination.  The 
notice indicated that the effective date of the termination would be six months from the 
date of the memo.  The notice also informed Moran that 
[p]rior to that date, you will receive a Severance Agreement that you will 
be required to sign in order to receive the severance provided under your 
Employment Agreement.  Please note that, as a result of recently enacted 
federal law and corresponding federal regulations, we cannot actually begin 
paying your severance until six months after the end of your employment – 
if we did, your severance would be subject to a 20 percent, non-deductible, 
excise tax.  I am advising you of this now so that you can make the 
necessary preparations. 
 
App. 318.  DaVita believed that this withholding of pay was necessary based on the 
unsettled IRS statute, 26 U.S.C. § 409A (“Section 409A”).  Moran continued to perform 
her duties under her employment contract after receiving the notice of termination.  
Moran‟s last day of work at DaVita was June 16, 2006.   
 On June 16, 2006, DaVita issued to Moran a Severance and General Release 
Agreement (the “Release”) which required her to release any claims against DaVita, 
including those under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and New Jersey‟s Law Against 
Discrimination.  In return, Moran would receive additional consideration compared to 
what she would have received under her Employment Agreement.  The Release stated the 
effective date of termination was June 16, 2006 and required Moran‟s execution in order 
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to receive any severance and notice pay immediately.  Specifically, the Release stated:  
“Moran hereby acknowledges that in order to receive the severance set forth below, she 
must execute this agreement, and if she does not execute this agreement, then she is not 
entitled to any severance payment under any agreement, company policy or applicable 
law.”  App. 405.  Moran never executed the Release.  DaVita discontinued her wages and 
benefits and did not begin payments on her severance.  Moran retained counsel and by 
letter on June 30, 2006, made a demand for reinstatement of her benefits. 
 At about the same time, DaVita also terminated the employment of Robert 
Oldfield and Donald Beuerle and offered both employees the same Release.  After the 
employees questioned the Section 409A six-month hold back period, DaVita determined 
that Oldfield and Beuerle most likely fell into an exception in the statute.  Oldfield and 
Beuerle were required to execute a release without Section 409A deferral language.  
After signing the release, both employees received their severance.   
On October 11, 2006, Moran filed suit against DaVita and Rodriguez (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as “DaVita”) for discrimination, breach of contract and retaliation, 
among other claims.  On December 30, 2006, DaVita made two deposits totaling 
$92,218.47, accounting for the remainder of Moran‟s notice pay that had been withheld 
for six months and the first of her severance payments.  However, on January 11, 2007, 
DaVita attempted to reverse this amount.  DaVita was only able to retrieve two amounts 
totaling $8,673.97 from Moran‟s bank account which were later restored on April 21, 
6 
 
2007.  Despite this reversal, DaVita paid Moran her severance on a timely basis through 
October 2007.  Moran has been paid in full for her notice period wages and severance. 
On March 23, 2009, the District Court granted summary judgment to DaVita on 
all counts except for Moran‟s claims for benefits.  On March 4, 2010, the District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge‟s findings that DaVita owed Moran $2,746.69 in benefits.  
Moran filed a timely notice of appeal.  
 
 
II. 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we apply the same legal standard as it 
should have applied.  Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2005).  A party is 
entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a).  In conducting our analysis, we must view the record in the light most favorable 
to Moran, and must draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.  See Vitalo, 399 F.3d at 
542.  To defeat summary judgment, however, Moran must “show[] that the materials 
cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 
III. 
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Moran limits her appeal to the denial of her retaliation claim, her allegation for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a breach of contract claim as it relates to 
her stock options.  Moran contends that after she received her notice of termination 
DaVita retaliated against her by withholding her pay and benefits because she objected to 
and failed to execute the Release.  She alleges further that DaVita‟s offering of the 
Release and the subsequent delay in payment was intended to cause her severe emotional 
distress.  Additionally, Moran maintains that DaVita violated her Employment 
Agreement by preventing her from exercising her stock options. 
 
A. 
Moran alleges that post-termination DaVita retaliated against her in violation of 
New Jersey‟s Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) by (1) asking her to sign a release 
agreement to receive her severance which threatened to deny her any severance under 
any agreement, company policy or applicable law if she failed to consent; (2) by delaying 
her severance and notice payments by six months based on Section 409A; (3) by 
depositing, reversing and then re-depositing payments into her bank account; and (4) by 
delaying reimbursement for expenses incurred at a Las Vegas team meeting. 
NJLAD contains an anti-retaliation provision which provides that it is an unlawful 
employment practice: 
[f]or any person to take reprisals against any person because that person has 
opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because that 
person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in proceedings under this 
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act or to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the 
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of that person having aided or 
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right 
granted or protected by this act.   
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(d).  To maintain a prima facie case of employer retaliation 
under NJLAD, a plaintiff must show:  (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she 
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected 
activity and the adverse employment action.  Lawrence v. Nat‟l Westminster Bank, 98 
F.3d 61, 71 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 665 
A.2d 1139, 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)).  Once a plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case of retaliation, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 
for its actions.  Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989).  If a legitimate, 
non-retaliatory reason is proffered, then the plaintiff must show evidence of the 
employer‟s discriminatory motive, and demonstrate that the legitimate reason was merely 
a pretext for the underlying discriminatory motive.  Romano, 665 A.2d at 1142.  To avoid 
summary judgment, the plaintiff‟s evidence must demonstrate “weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer‟s 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find [these reasons] unworthy of credence, . . . and hence, infer that the employer did not 
act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.”  Id.  (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994)) (quotation marks omitted).   
9 
 
 We hold that Moran has failed to establish a claim for retaliation under NJLAD.  
Moran‟s contention that the offering of the Release was retaliation per se is unsupported 
and unpersuasive.  Further, Moran has not demonstrated the requisite elements for a 
prima facie case of retaliation.  Even assuming that a prima facie case can be established, 
DaVita has proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions based on Section 
409A and Moran has failed to show this reason was a pretext for discrimination.
1
  As to 
Moran‟s claim about delayed reimbursement, DaVita again proffered a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason – DaVita‟s concern that Moran had overcharged the company, which 
prompted the need to audit her expense report – and Moran has similarly failed to show 
this reason was a pretext for discrimination.  Therefore, we conclude that Moran‟s 
retaliation claim has no merit and will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment as to her retaliation claim.   
B.  
 
Moran alleges that DaVita‟s act of offering her an unlawful Release and its delay 
in distributing her payments constitute outrageous behavior that were intended to cause 
her severe emotional distress.  In New Jersey, to recover under a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant intended to 
                                              
1
 Moran also appeals the District Court‟s denial of her motion to strike DaVita‟s Section 
409A defense.  We conclude that there was no error in the District Court‟s ruling that “to 
eliminate a defense at this late stage in the litigation, after summary judgment motions 
have been filed and briefed, would be highly prejudicial to [DaVita].”  App. 46; see 
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that 
evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).  
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cause emotional distress; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the actions 
proximately caused emotional distress; and (4) the emotional stress was severe.  Buckley 
v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc‟y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988).  Such conduct must be 
particularly “„outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community.‟”  49 Prospect St. Tenants Assoc. v. Sheva Gardens, Inc., 547 A.2d 
1134, 1145 (N.J. App. Div. 1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d 
(1965)).  Liability “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty 
oppressions or other trivialities.”  Id.  Moreover, the emotional stress suffered by the 
plaintiff must be “so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.”  
Buckley, 544 A.2d at 863.  As we have noted, and New Jersey courts have confirmed, “it 
is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level of 
outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”  Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d 
Cir. 1988); Griffin v. Tops Appliance City, Inc., 766 A.2d 292, 297 (N.J. App. Div. 
2001). 
We conclude that Moran has failed to establish a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  We agree with the District Court that the conduct alleged does not 
rise to the level of outrageous behavior that is intolerable in civilized society.  Therefore, 
we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment as to Moran‟s claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.   
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C.  
 
Moran argues that the District Court erred by denying her claim for damages 
stemming from her inability to exercise her stock options.  The District Court held that 
Moran was disqualified from exercising her stock options -- which did not vest until 
October 31, 2006 -- because it found that DaVita did not breach its Employment 
Agreement with Moran by terminating her on June 16, 2006.   
 The language of the Employment Agreement required DaVita to provide Moran 
with a six-month period of notice after notice of termination was served.  Since Moran 
received her notice of termination on May 2, 2006, her notice period of employment 
continued until November 2, 2006.  While the Employment Agreement provided that 
during this notice period DaVita was entitled to “remove” Moran from her employment 
duties, we conclude that removal of Moran does not equate to the “termination” of her 
employment; removal only allowed DaVita to extinguish Moran‟s obligation to continue 
performing her employment duties.  As such, Moran‟s termination date under her 
Employment Agreement was November 2, 2006, not the date of her removal, June 16, 
2006, and thus, Moran had until November 2, 2006 to exercise her stock options.  Since 
her stock options vested on October 31, 2006, Moran should have been permitted to 
exercise timely her vested stock options.  As a result, we will vacate the District Court‟s 
judgment regarding this claim.   
To sustain a claim for damages, Moran must provide evidence as to the date on 
which she would have exercised her options.  Although she made no attempt to exercise 
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her options, Moran maintains that she would have exercised her options on October 31, 
2006.  The District Court may find this argument persuasive in light of the timing of 
Moran‟s inquiry regarding her stock options and DaVita‟s lack of response.  After her 
notice of termination, Moran inquired of DaVita to no avail:  “Given my termination date 
of November 2, 2006, please verify that I will be able to vest my GERP 2004 as well as 
ex[ercise] my Oct 06 stock options.”  App. 615.  Moran‟s inquiry may have signaled her 
intent to exercise her stock options after their vesting date.  However, we conclude that 
the record needs to be developed further as to what specific date Moran would have 
exercised her options, and, then accordingly, as to what would be an appropriate 
calculation of damages.  Hence, we remand this claim to the District Court for further 
proceedings.   
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment as to 
Moran‟s claims for retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  We will 
vacate the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment as to Moran‟s breach of contract 
claim as it relates to her stock options and remand this claim to the District Court for 
further proceedings.   
